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Abstract 
The purpose of the study is to extend further from the result studying overconfidence effects of CEOs 
on single deal of Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s article to study overconfidence effects of CEOs on 
multiple mergers and acquisitions. Based on the psychological and financial theories, the likelihood 
of overconfident CEOs acquiring a company is the net effect of two manifestations of overconfi-
dence. The first manifestation is called miscalibration in psychology. Under this manifestation, 
overconfident CEOs overestimate the benefits and underestimate the costs of the merger. Thus, it 
increases the odds of overconfident CEOs undertaking the acquiring project. On the other hand, the 
second manifestation is called ‘’better-than-average’’ effect. Under this manifestation, overconfident 
CEOs will curb investment to avoid external finance if the firms do not have sufficient internal fund. 
The reason for this biased decision is because overconfident CEOs believe that their firms are un-
dervalued by the market. They want to avoid external finance so that the mispricing gap does not 
become greater. The net effect of the two manifestations of overconfidence on the probability of 
overconfident CEOs pursuing multiple mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is debatable. Malmendier 
and Tate (2008) empirically prove that overconfident CEOs are more likely to purchase another firm 
than non-overconfident colleagues in single deal. Moreover, the announcement effect of single deal 
by overconfident CEOs is significantly more negative than their rational counterparts’ results. 
  The sample used in the study consists of 622 mergers of 306 firms occurred in the US during 2006-
2013. The data is retrieved from SDC Platinum, Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat. 
  I find no evidence about the acquisitiveness and the worse performance of overconfident CEOs 
compared to others in multiple M&As. My findings suggest that overconfident CEOs are equally 
acquisitive as non-overconfident CEOs in multiple deals. Their multiple M&A deals receive similar 
announcement returns to others’ during the normal economic cycle. One interesting observation is 
that during the financial crisis overconfident CEOs are more acquisitive in multiple acquisitions 
than rational CEOs. Although the majority of overconfident CEO’s mergers are diversifying, they 
still receive significantly positive abnormal returns as opposed to the non-overconfident counter-
parts’. The reason for the interesting findings can be either investor sentiment or the external sup-
port of a strong and independent board as well as CEO’s personal trading experience. 
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1. Introduction 
Overconfidence in merger and acquisitions (M&A) is not a new concept. The overconfidence 
topic has received a massive amount of media coverage. For example, an article from Bloom-
berg describes Mark Zuckerberg as overconfident and another article from Forbes says his de-
cision to buy Whatsapp at 19 billion USD is overoptimistic. Mark Zuckerberg ‘’have a lot of 
confidence but also a lot of ego and pride. They (Mark Zuckerberg) are not going to let someone 
else pioneer the future’’ (Bloomberg Business). The decision to buy WhatsApp at 19 billion 
USD of Mark Zuckerberg is considered overoptimistic: ‘’to justify 19 billion USD, WhatsApp 
would need to generate around 1 billion USD in annual cash flow by our model’s terminal year 
of 2018” and “we could arrive at 650 million USD in revenue. 1 billion USD is possible, but 
given the optimism already incorporated in a 650 million USD figure, it might seem a stretch’’ 
(Forbes). 
In psychology, overconfidence is associated with the calibration and probability judgment. The 
term itself is often identical with one of the forms of miscalibration. The most essential exten-
sions to this definition, are studies of overconfidence in the context of positive illusions. Posi-
tive illusions include the better-than-average effect, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism. 
Overconfidence has been defined as a specific form of miscalibration, of which ‘’the assigned 
probability that the answers given are correct exceeds the true accuracy of the answers’’ (Skala, 
2008). 
Consistent with this theory, Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein (1977)'s findings show that 
when asked questions of general knowledge, people are too often wrong when they are certain 
about the answer to a question. Illusion of control is when people believe that they are able to 
influence events which in fact are controlled mainly by chance (Taylor and Brown, 1988). A 
clear example of this cognitive bias is that a gambler insists on throwing a dice by himself as if 
it could lead to a more favorable result (Skala, 2008). The tendency of people to have an unre-
alistically positive view of themselves is called the better-than-average effect in psychology. 
For instance, Svenson (1981) shows evidence that a great portion of drivers have ‘’strong ten-
dency to believe oneself safer and more skillful than the average driver’’. 
Investors and managers afflicted with overconfidence often make mistakes in decision making. 
Chuang and Lee (2006) prove that overconfident investors overreact to private information and 
under-react to public information. Moreover, they find that market gains make overconfident 
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investors trade more aggressively in subsequent periods. Malmendier and Tate (2005) present 
that overconfident CEOs are more responsive to cash flow than their peers. When their financial 
resources are abundant, they tend to overestimate the return of their investing projects and over-
invest on the projects. When firms are financially constrained, overconfident CEOs tend to re-
duce budget on investments. Furthermore, overconfident CEOs pay dividend back to share-
holders less than non-overconfident CEOs. Since overconfident CEOs view external financing 
as the more costly option, they pay less dividend to build financial slack for future investment 
needs (Deshmukh, Goel and Howe, 2013). 
Intuitively one could argue that overconfident CEOs would be similar to empire building CEOs. 
Empire builders are CEOs who like to buy companies to increase the size of the company under 
his/her management, even when the acquisition may be value destroying (Jensen, 1986). There 
is evidence that abnormal announcement return by cash rich bidders is significantly negative 
and decreasing in proportion with the amount of excess cash held by the bidders (Harford, 1999). 
However, unlike empire builders, overconfident CEOs make value destroying decisions be-
cause they believe they are maximizing shareholder value. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) distinguish between overconfident CEOs and entrenched CEOs 
by their decision in holding vested options. The authors argue that overconfident CEOs are 
willing to invest personally in their company by holding vested options until expiration while 
entrenched managers are not. The researchers want to find the answer to the research question 
whether overconfident CEOs are more likely to acquire other firms than non-overconfident 
CEOs. Another research question is that whether or not overconfident CEOs’ deals will gener-
ate more negative abnormal return than deals made by others. 
The likelihood of making acquisition deals in overconfident CEOs is the result of two manifes-
tations of overconfidence that have opposing effects. The first manifestation is miscalibration. 
Overconfident CEOs may misevaluate the cost and benefits of the investments and go forward 
with even the negative synergy mergers. This manifestation increases the likelihood of acquir-
ing other firms. The second manifestation is the better-than-average effect. Overconfident 
CEOs believe their firms are undervalued by the market, therefore, they try to avoid external 
finance to not further undermine their shareholder value. If their firms are financially con-
strained, they won’t have enough resources to do mergers. Therefore, the likelihood of making 
acquisition deals by overconfident CEOs is decreasing in the second manifestation. The authors 
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find that the odds of making an acquisition are 65% higher if the CEO is classified as overcon-
fidence. The market reaction at merger announcement is significantly more negative than for 
rational CEOs. The odds of an acquisition made by overconfident CEOs are the largest if the 
merger is diversifying and does not require external financing. 
This thesis aims to employ the method in Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s study to examine 
overconfident CEOs in making merger and acquisition related decisions using the more recent 
data from 2006 to 2013. The major difference between this thesis and Malmendier and Tate 
(2008)’s research is while Malmendier and Tate (2008) focuses on the likelihood of a CEO 
making acquisitions (The sample size includes CEOs making no acquisition and CEOs making 
acquisitions), this study chooses to investigate the likelihood of a CEO making multiple acqui-
sitions (The sample size includes CEOs with at least one acquisition).  
Following the original study, I construct overconfidence variable based on CEO’s option hold-
ing behavior. According to Lambert, Larcker and Verrecchia (1991), CEOs invest their human 
capital into the company and receive equity based compensation. Therefore, CEOs place con-
siderable amount of their investment in their firm’s stock performance. Risk averse CEOs 
should exercise options early if the stock price is sufficiently high. They shouldn’t keep the 
options until expiration since CEOs cannot legally hedge the risk of their option holding by 
short selling company stock. Thus, if a CEO fails to exercise their options and hold them until 
expiration despite the fact that the options are deep in the money, he/she is classified as over-
confidence (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
After constructing overconfidence variables, I use multivariate regression model to examine 
the relationship between market reaction and overconfidence in multiple mergers. Although 
this model couldn’t eliminate the time-invariant effects affecting the market abnormal return 
like the random and fixed effect models, it is sufficient for this study because of the small 
sample size. I find no evidence supporting the hypothesis that overconfident CEOs are more 
likely to acquire multiple firms than their rational counterparts in the normal economic cycle 
during the period from 2006 to 2013. In the normal economic cycle, overconfident CEOs are 
not more likely to acquire other firms than their rational counterparts. Moreover, their multiple 
acquisitions do not receive more negative abnormal return than their peers’. Probably, during 
the sample period, the borrowing costs are too high in the opinion of overconfident CEOs. Thus, 
the multiple merger acquisition likelihood is less than the single merger acquisition likelihood 
as in Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s outcome. 
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My contribution to this topic is the finding that during the financial crisis, overconfident CEOs 
are significantly more likely to acquire multiple firms, especially firms in other industries and 
those deals tend to have more positive abnormal returns. There are two possible explanations 
based on existing literature for the observed result. The first possible explanation is during the 
financial crisis, investors become more irrational and they prefer high risk companies and M&A 
deals (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). That explains why normally diversifying deals should receive 
negative abnormal return but in this study in 2008 and 2009 they receive significantly positive 
market response (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). The second possible explanation is per-
formance of overconfident CEOs has been enhanced during the difficult time because of the 
external help from their independent and small board (Kolasinki and Li, 2013). 
This study relates to several areas of research. Already, many researchers find investors reacting 
differently to CEOs with different characteristics in M&A announcements (Lee and James, 
2007; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Custodio and Metzger, 2013; Fang, Francis and Hasan, 2012). 
In addition, this study links with literature of overconfidence of managers in corporate finance. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) suggests that overconfidence in managers may lead to value de-
stroying deals. Billet and Qian (2008) show the market reaction become negatives from the 
second deals onward with acquiring CEOs. 
The thesis is structured as follow: section 2 shows the previous literature regarding the topic. 
Section 3 presents the hypotheses of this study. Section 4 introduces the data and section 5 
reveals methods. Section 6 reports the results and section 7 discusses explanations and impli-
cations. Section 8 concludes the study and make suggestions for further study. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Market reaction to CEO characteristics 
To be able to fully grasp the significance of the market reactions to multiple mergers made by 
overconfident CEOs, it is necessary to understand the background of the relationship between 
varied CEO characteristics and market reactions to corporate events. Whether it is CEO gender 
(Lee and James, 2007; Huang and Kisgen, 2013) or CEO industry expertise (Custodio and 
Metzger, 2013) or CEO social network (Fang, Francis and Hasan, 2012), such characteristics 
can have positive or negative effects on company stock price around the event announcement 
date. I will take up the discussion of different aspects of CEOs in detail in the following section. 
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2.1.1. CEO gender 
Lee and James (2007) find that investors’ responses to the announcements of appointing female 
CEOs are significantly more negative than those of their male counterparts. When investors 
react to the news of a succeeded CEO to be female, stock price go through a -2.47% abnormal 
return. On the other hand, the average abnormal return is only -0.5% in the case of a male CEO 
appointment. To make the argument more valid, the authors conduct a robustness check with 
press release surrounding the announcements of male and female CEOs. The results show that 
articles about the appointment of a female CEO tend to point out gender and gender related 
considerations while articles about the appointment of a male CEO tend to be gender-neutral 
and more job and organization focused. The findings verify stock market reactions to the ap-
pointment of CEOs change significantly depending on the gender of the CEOs. 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) have pursued similar research topic in the field of finance to find 
somewhat contrary results. Despite the less favorable market reaction to female CEO appoint-
ment found in the previous research, the authors present that investors react more favorably to 
significant corporate financial decisions made by firms with female executives. They find evi-
dence that women make different corporate financial and investment decisions than men. Firms 
with female executives grow more slowly and are less likely to make acquisitions. Yet, once 
acquisitions are made by female executives, they have greater announcement returns in com-
parison with those made by firms with male executives. For capital structure decisions, female 
executives are less likely to issue debt. Also, announcement returns for debt offerings are higher 
when the firm has a female executive. To sum up, market reaction to corporate financial and 
investment decisions is different by the gender of the firm executives. 
2.1.2. CEO Industry Experience 
Although a variety of studies show that CEOs affect corporate policies and corporate value, 
Custodio and Metzger (2013) acknowledge the relative ignorance of how CEOs create value 
when studying the effect of CEO industry expertise on acquisition returns. Acquirers’ abnormal 
announcement returns are two to three times higher if the CEO has previous experience in the 
target industry. The researchers differentiate between the CEOs’ abilities to create a larger mer-
ger surplus (value creation) and their abilities to capture a larger fraction of this surplus for their 
shareholders in the bargaining process (value capture). Their findings suggest that industry ex-
perts perform better in negotiating with a target, resulting in paying a significantly lower pre-
mium for the target shareholders’ shares. The reason for the enhanced bargaining ability from 
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CEO industry experience is information based. Experienced CEOs are able to achieve signifi-
cantly higher abnormal returns if the target is a private company where there is greater infor-
mation asymmetry. All in all, market react more positively to CEOs with industry experience 
similar to target’s industry than CEOs without the expertise. 
2.1.3. CEO Social Network 
Fang, Francis and Hasan (2012) admit that only a few studies have looked into the diversity of 
social contexts faced by managers, thus motivate themselves to study the market reaction to 
merger announcement by CEOs with varied heterogeneous social network. Heterogeneous 
group of people are those ‘’who themselves have different demographic attributes, intellectual 
backgrounds, occupational experiences and international experiences’’. Their results consist-
ently show that firms in which the old CEO is replaced with a new CEO with greater social 
network heterogeneity experience a significantly positive market response. They present robust 
evidence in both cases of diversified and focused M&A deals. To conclude, investment deci-
sions of CEOs with a diverse social network are received by the market with higher positive 
abnormal returns than CEOs’ with homogeneous social network. 
2.2. Overconfidence 
Research literature in psychology has for long studied overconfidence. Overconfidence in psy-
chology is associated with calibration and probability judgment. The term itself is often identi-
cal with one of the forms of miscalibration. The most fundamental extension to this definition 
scope, are studies of overconfidence in the context of positive illusions, i.e. the better-than-
average effect, illusion of control and unrealistic optimism (Skala, 2008). The first extended 
definition of overconfidence is the ‘’overestimation of one’s actual ability, performance, level 
of control, or chance of success’’ (‘’illusion of control’’) (Langer, 1975; Clayson, 2005; Moore 
and Healy, 2007). The second extended version of overconfidence is when ‘’people believe 
themselves to be better than others, such as when a majority of people rate themselves better 
than the median’’ (‘’better-than-average effect’’) (Svenson, 1981; Taylor and Brown, 1988; 
Moore and Healy, 2007). The third extended way overconfidence has been measured is ‘’ex-
cessive certainty regarding the accuracy of one’s beliefs’’ (‘’unrealistic optimism’’) (Weinstein, 
1980; Moore and Healy, 2007). I will begin this section by reviewing psychology literature 
about how overconfidence affects laymen. Then I will continue to explore what are the impacts 
of overconfidence on professionals, which include investors in financial market and managers 
in corporate finance. 
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2.2.1. Overconfidence in psychology 
a. Miscalibration 
In psychology, calibration is usually studied based on how interviewees answer general 
knowledge questions presented by researchers. Experiment participants answer a set of ques-
tions and have to determine the probability that their answer was correct. Miscalibration is ‘’the 
difference between the accuracy rate and probability assigned’’ (that a given answer is correct) 
(Skala, 2008). One great example of miscalibration is Fischhoff, Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1977)’s study. Their study suggests that for a collection of general knowledge questions (e.g. 
absinthe is a) a liqueur or b) a precious stone), subjects were persistently overconfident. To 
answer the questions, subjects first determine the most likely answer and then demonstrate their 
degree of certainty that the answer they had selected was, in fact, correct. Participants were so 
overconfident on their answers so that they were likely to stake money on their validity. The 
study concludes that people are too often wrong when they are certain about the answer to a 
question. 
b. Illusion of control 
Illusion of control is when people tend to believe they are able to affect events which in fact are 
controlled mainly, or purely by chance (Taylor and Brown, 1988). A clear example of this cog-
nitive bias is a gambler’s request to throw a dice by himself/herself as if it could then show a 
more satisfactory result (Skala, 2008). The previous research on illusion of control shows that 
people often fail to respond differently to controllable and uncontrollable events. Controllable 
events require skills and uncontrollable events only need luck to succeed. However, their study 
sheds little light on which factors may systematically dictate this illusory control behavior. 
Langer (1975) acknowledges the void in previous research and pioneers in studying skill-situ-
ation-related factors and their effects. He predicts that factors from skill situations (competition, 
choice, familiarity, involvement) introduced into chance situations would make individuals feel 
inappropriately confident. He conducts six studies to examine his research question. Results of 
confidence in all six studies supported the predicted hypotheses. 
Clayson (2005) finds evidence for the cause of illusion of control in students. Students consist-
ently overestimate their performance on academic exams, with the estimation error being in-
versely related to their grades. But the true source of the effect whether it is a matter of compe-
tency of students or whether it is a matter of systematic errors in students’ past experience and 
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expectations, is unexamined. The author solves the question by carrying out different experi-
ments in different classes. In nine classes, the author adopted a policy of telling students early 
in the selected courses that certain academic standards will be maintained regardless of the 
standards of any other class. In other undergraduate classes the author did not mention these 
expectations. Although the procedure did not totally eliminate the overestimation effect, in the 
nine classes that apply the policy, students expected a course average grade of 2.70 while actu-
ally receiving a grade of 2.85. In other classes without the policy, the students expected a grade 
of 2.69 and received 2.25. All in all, it is apparently clear that the part of the overestimation 
(illusion of control) is caused by a systematic effect. The systematic effect originates from the 
difference in perception of the students with actual grading standards. 
c. Better-than-average effect 
Psychological research has established that, in general, people tend to have an unrealistically 
positive view of themselves. When we compare ourselves to a group (of co-students, co-work-
ers, random participants), most of us believe to be ‘’superior to an average representative of the 
group in various fields’’ (Skala, 2008). Svenson (1981) shows evidence supporting that con-
clusion from an experiment with one group of US participants and another group of Swedish 
participants. In the experiment, subjects were asked to compare themselves with a more well-
defined population of drivers whose characteristics were at least partly known to the subjects 
(i.e. other participants in the room). Such comparisons should diminish possible effects of group 
stereotypes (Californians are better drivers). In the US group 88% and in the Swedish group 
77% of participants believed themselves to be safer than the median driver. In the US sample 
93% of the people believed themselves to be more skillful drivers than the median driver and 
69% of the Swedish drivers shared this belief in association with their comparison group. In 
summary, there was a ‘’strong tendency to believe oneself safer and more skillful than the av-
erage driver’’ (Svenson, 1981). 
d. Unrealistic optimism  
Several findings in this area can be summed up as ''The future will be great, especially for me'' 
(Taylor and Brown, 1988). One great example of the tendency of people to be unrealistically 
optimistic about future life events is the article of Weinstein (1980) where he carried on two 
experiments. In experiment 1, 258 college students assessed how much their own chances of 
undergoing 42 events differed from the chances of their classmates. Overall, they rated their 
own chances to be above average for positive events and below average for negative events. 
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Experiment 2 considered the idea that people are unrealistically optimistic because they con-
centrate on factors that promote their own chances of achieving favorable outcomes and fail to 
recognize that others may have just as many factors on their side. Students listed the factors 
that they thought had an impact on their own chances of undergoing eight future events. When 
such lists were read by a second group of students, the amount of unrealistic optimism presented 
by this second group for the same eight events diminished significantly, although it was not 
eliminated.  
2.2.2. Overconfidence in finance 
The majority of literature concerning overconfidence not only concentrates around psychology 
aspect but also draws attention to financial market and corporate finance. In financial market, 
literature concerning overconfidence helps explain anomalous findings in characteristics of in-
vestors and its effects on investors. In corporate finance, literature is divided according to the 
mergers and acquisitions decisions and financing and investment decisions. I will discuss in 
detail the above divisions of overconfidence in these two areas of finance.  
a. Overconfidence in asset pricing 
Recently, several behavioral finance models based on the overconfidence hypothesis have been 
proposed to explain anomalous findings, including a short term continuation (momentum) and 
a long term reversal in stock returns. Chuang and Lee (2006) use US data to show empirically 
various effects of overconfidence. First, they find that if investors are overconfident, they over-
react to private information and underreact to public information. Second, they present that 
market gains make overconfident investors trade more aggressively in subsequent periods. 
Third, excessive trading of overconfident investors in securities markets is a significant factor 
to explain the observed excessive volatility. Fourth, overconfident investors underestimate risk 
and trade more frequently in riskier securities. 
Psychological research demonstrates that, in areas such as finance, men are more overconfident 
than women. Thus, Barber and Odean (2001) test the prediction that overconfident investors 
trade excessively by classifying investors on gender. Using account data for over 35,000 house-
holds from a large discount brokerage, they consider the common stock investments of both 
genders from February 1991 through January 1997. They document that men trade 45 percent 
more than women. Frequent trading diminishes men’s net returns by 2.65 percentage points a 
year compared to 1.72 percentage points for women. 
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b. Overconfidence in managers in corporate finance 
There is a growing size of academic literature concerning the consequences of biased managers 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2005; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Hribar and Yang, 2013). Biased 
managers may handle financing and investment decisions differently to other managers (Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2005), may pursue value destroying acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008), may miscalibrate the future’s earnings (Hribar and Yang, 2013), may be turned over 
faster than other CEOs (Goel and Thakor, 2008), etc. I am going to analyze the recent men-
tioned issues of overconfident managers in depth in the following section. 
- CEO optimisms on financing and investment decisions 
Overconfident CEOs handle company cash and stock differently from non-overconfident CEOs. 
While non-overconfident CEOs view project net present value and required rate of return as 
criteria to make investment decisions, overconfident CEOs will view external finance as costly 
and choose avoiding external finance as criteria. Hence, overconfident CEOs are more respon-
sive to cash flow than their peers. When their internal fund is abundant, they tend to overesti-
mate the return of their investing projects and overinvest on the projects. When firms are finan-
cially constrained, overconfident CEOs decrease budget on investment (Malmendier and Tate, 
2005). Besides, overconfident CEOs will issue equity less than their peers because overconfi-
dent CEOs choose to depend financially heavily on cash. The reason for that is that they over-
estimate their firms’ future cash flows and hence believe that their firms are undervalued by the 
market. If they have to use external finance, they prefer debt to equity, since equity prices are 
more sensitive to differences in opinions about future cash flows. All in all, overconfident CEOs 
are reluctant to access external financing which may result in ‘’low levels of risky debt relative 
to available interest tax deductions’’ (Malmendier and Tate, 2011). Moreover, overconfident 
CEOs pay less dividend back to shareholders than non-overconfident CEOs. Since they con-
sider the option of external financing more costly, they pay less dividend to build financial slack 
for future investment needs. Consistent with the main prediction, the authors find that the level 
of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to 
be overconfident. This reduction in dividends related to CEO overconfidence is higher in firms 
with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. The argument is enhanced by the evi-
dence that the significance of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement 
is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence (Deshmukh, Goel and 
Howe, 2013). Last but not least, overconfident CEOs are statistically significantly more likely 
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to complete the intended share repurchase than non-overconfident CEOs because overconfident 
CEOs overestimate the value of their shares. Overconfident CEOs perceive their shares as un-
dervalued and have a greater buyback completion rate (Andriosopoulis, Andriosopoulis and 
Hoque, 2013). 
- CEO optimisms on M&A 
Overconfident CEOs may make value destroying acquisitions compared to rational CEOs. Hu-
bris on the part of individual decision makers in bidding firms can explain why bids are made 
even when a valuation above the current market price represents a positive valuation error. 
Bidding firms inflicted with hubris simply pay too much for their targets (Roll, 1986). There is 
a lot of evidence for hubris hypothesis. For instance, CEOs’ first deal exhibit zero announce-
ment effects while their subsequent deals exhibit negative announcement effects. In fact, pre-
vious positive performance does not prevent the negative wealth effects in subsequent deals. 
Interestingly, CEOs’ net purchase of stock is greater preceding subsequent deals than it is for 
first deals (Billet and Qian, 2008). Another evidence is that the odds of making an acquisition 
are 65% higher if the CEO is categorized as overconfidence. The market response at merger 
announcement for overconfident CEOs (-90 basis point) is significantly more negative than for 
non-overconfident CEOs (-12 basis point). The chance of an acquisition made by overconfident 
CEOs is greatest if the merger is diversifying and does not require external financing (Mal-
mendier and Tate, 2008). Overconfident CEOs help explain the frequencies of diversifying and 
non-diversifying deals and preference of cash as the main choice of bidder’s payment not only 
in domestic mergers but also in international mergers (Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal, 2013). 
In addition, companies whose CEOs withdraw from acquisition deals for price reason receive 
positive abnormal returns at deal withdrawal announcement. The deal withdrawal by the CEOs 
sends the positive signal to the market that CEOs are acting on the best of shareholders’ interest. 
On the contrary, since overconfident CEOs overestimate merger synergies and misevaluate 
some merger opportunities with negative synergies to be value-creating, acquisitions made by 
overconfident CEOs concern the market that the CEOs overbid for the target and destroy share-
holder values (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Jacobsen, 2014). 
Intuitively one could argue that overconfident CEOs would be similar to empire building CEOs. 
Empire builders are CEOs who would like to increase the size of the companies under his/her 
management even when the merger may be value destroying (Jensen, 1986). Cash-richness 
predicts that a firm will become a bidder after controlling for stock price performance and sales 
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growth. There is evidence that abnormal stock price reaction to acquisition bid announcements 
by cash rich bidders is significantly negative and decreasing proportionally with excess cash 
held by the bidders. Furthermore, the number of cash rich firms undertaking diversifying ac-
quisitions are significantly greater than the number of cash poor firms doing so (Harford, 1999). 
However, unlike empire builders, overconfident CEOs may make value destroying and low 
synergy mergers because they believe they are maximizing shareholder value through the mer-
ger (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). They argue that overconfident CEOs are willing to invest 
personally in their company by holding vested options until expiration. Therefore, it is acknowl-
edged that although sharing similarities with empire builders in merger deal characteristics, 
overconfident CEOs are different from empire builders who purposefully violate agency con-
flict of interest code. 
- CEO optimisms and forecast 
Overconfident CEOs make earnings forecasts differently from non-overconfident CEOs. First, 
overconfident CEOs are more likely to issue earnings forecasts than non-overconfident CEOs 
although forecast issuance is voluntary. It is because overconfident CEOs overestimate firm 
future performance (miscalibration) and believe they are better than average (dispositional op-
timism) (Libby and Rennekamp, 2011). Furthermore, overconfident CEOs overestimate the 
mean of expected earnings. They issue more optimistic forecasts (miscalibration). Additionally, 
overconfident CEOs underestimate the variance of expected earnings. They are more likely to 
make point estimate compared to interval estimate (miscalibration) (Hribar and Yang, 2013). 
Last but not least, female executives who are believed to not suffer from overconfidence com-
pared to their male colleagues, place wider bounds on earnings estimates than male executives 
(Huang and Kisgen, 2012). 
- CEO optimisms and other issues 
Previous empirical work on adverse consequences of CEO overconfidence raises the question 
of why firms hire overconfident managers. Theoretical research suggests a reason that is over-
confidence can benefit shareholders by increasing investment in risky projects. Using options 
and press based proxies for CEO overconfidence, Hirshleifer, Low and Teoh (2012) find that 
over the 1993-2003 period, firms with overconfident CEOs have greater return volatility, invest 
more in innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and achieve greater innovative 
success for given research and development expenditures. However, overconfident managers 
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achieve greater innovation only in innovative industries. All in all, their findings suggest that 
overconfidence contributes to CEOs’ exploiting innovative growth opportunities. 
Goel and Thakor (2008) develop a model that shows that an overconfident manager has a 
greater likelihood than a non-overconfident manager of being deliberately promoted to CEO 
under value-maximizing corporate governance. Under the optimal CEO compensation contract, 
a rational, risk-averse CEO underinvests in projects relative to the shareholders’ optimum. This 
underinvestment reduces firm value. The researchers show that ‘’a moderately overconfident 
risk-averse CEO increases firm value by mitigating the underinvestment problem’’ (Goel and 
Thakor, 2008). The reason is that an overconfident CEO overestimates the precision of her 
private information and overreacts to it. Thus, she invests in a project even when her positive 
information about the project is such that she would not invest in the project if she were rational. 
Gervais, Heaton and Odean (2011)’s findings complement the work of Goel and Thakor (2008), 
who show that moderate level of manager overconfidence creates positive value for sharehold-
ers, while extreme levels of overconfidence destroy shareholder value. Gervais, Heaton and 
Odean (2011)’s analysis shows that the introduction of labor markets in the model leads to 
similar results about the welfare of managers. Overconfident CEOs are more likely to imple-
ment risky projects that are benefitting shareholders since a risk-averse manager’s overconfi-
dence makes him less conservative. ‘’A modest amount of performance-based compensation is 
then sufficient to realign the manager’s incentives’’ (Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). When 
a competitive labor market is present, the firms have to compete to attract the mildly overcon-
fident CEO by increasing the safer portion of his compensation. If the manager’s excessively 
overconfident, the firms should increase his performance-based compensation to shift risk onto 
the managers. To sum up, overconfident managers are more attractive to firms than their ra-
tional counterparts because overconfidence motivates and commits them to undertake valuable 
risky projects. However, extreme overconfidence is harmful to the manager because the com-
pensation contract will expose him to excessive risks. 
Although overconfidence is an international phenomenon, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal 
(2013) establish a number of important findings regarding common demographic and country 
characteristics in the global distribution of overconfident CEOs. The authors find that ‘’over-
confident CEOs tend to lead firms headquartered in Christian countries’’. The researchers also 
find that the Hofstede (1980), (2001) measures of national culture are significant factors to 
explain geographical patterns in the distribution of overconfident CEOs. CEOs operating in 
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countries whose cultures focus on a long-term orientation tend to have less overconfidence. In 
conclusion, CEO overconfidence is an international phenomenon, although there are distinct 
patterns in its global distribution. 
Little evidence exists on whether overconfident CEOs can improve on their merger and acqui-
sition performance. Kolasinki and Li (2013) provide evidence that strong and independent 
boards help overconfident CEOs avoid honest mistakes when they seek to acquire other com-
panies. In addition, the authors find that once-overconfident CEOs make better acquisition de-
cision after they experience personal stock trading losses, providing evidence that a manager’s 
recent personal experience, and not just educational and early career experience, influences firm 
investment policy.  
 
3. Research Questions 
3.1. Research Question 1 
Overconfident CEOs are more likely to undertake mergers and acquisitions since they are more 
likely to undertake risky projects (Gervais, Heaton and Odean, 2011). They overestimate the 
benefits of the projects and underestimate the costs and risk of the project. Moreover, they 
underinvest in information production. An overconfident manager overvalues the precision of 
his signal, and so is overly-inclined to pursue (abandon) the project when his information is 
positive (negative) (Goel and Thakor, 2008). This is the first manifestation of overconfidence 
in managers. According to psychology literature this is called unrealistic optimism and ‘’better-
than-average’’ effect.  
On the other hand, overconfident CEOs are more responsive to cash flow than their rational 
counterparts. Overconfident CEOs systematically overvalue the returns to their investment pro-
jects. If their financial budget for investment is abundant and they are not disciplined by the 
capital market or corporate governance mechanisms, they overinvest relative to the first-best. 
If they are financially constrained, however, they are reluctant to issue new equity because they 
perceive the stock of their company to be undervalued by the market. As a result, they diminish 
their investment. Additional cash flow provides an opportunity to invest closer to their desired 
level (Malmendier and Tate, 2005). This is the second manifestation of overconfidence in man-
agers. In psychology theories, it is also originated from the ‘’better-than-average’’ effect. 
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These two manifestations of overconfidence play as opposing forces against each other. Alt-
hough the net effect of the two manifestations of overconfident CEOs making single M&A has 
been empirically proved by Malmendier and Tate (2008), the net effect of the two manifesta-
tions on the willingness of overconfident CEOs making multiple mergers and acquisitions, 
therefore, remains unexplored.  
Thus, the first research question is ‘’Are overconfident CEOs more likely to make multiple 
mergers and acquisitions than non-overconfident CEOs?’’ 
The null hypothesis H1 is ‘’Overconfident CEOs are not more likely to make multiple acquisi-
tions than their rational counterparts’’. 
If the null hypothesis H1 is rejected, the alternative hypothesis H2 is ‘’Overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to make multiple acquisitions than their rational counterparts’’. 
3.2. Research Question 2 
Overconfidence also has implication for the value creation by mergers. Overconfident CEOs 
are subject to miscalibration. If overconfident people are asked to estimate probability to the 
experimental questions, in both easy and difficult questions, ‘’their assigned probability that 
the answers given are correct exceeds the true accuracy of the answers’’ (Skala, 2008). Thus, 
in this light it is natural that they overvalue the merger synergies. For instance, they could mis-
perceive mergers with little or negative synergies into those with positive synergies (Malmend-
ier and Tate, 2008). Furthermore, the above synergy misevaluation is continued by their under-
investment in information production. Since overconfident CEOs overestimate the precision of 
their information, they are more inclined to go forward with the merger providing that their 
deal-related information is positive (Goel and Thakor, 2008).  
Moreover, overconfident CEOs may have ‘’too high reservation price to bid for the mergers’’ 
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Overconfident CEOs are more likely to overpay for the deal 
when there are competitors for the target companies in the bidding process. The evidence for 
that is market rewards the announcement of deal withdrawal of rational CEOs. The reason for 
the deal withdrawal is the asking price of the target is too high compared to the bidding price 
of the acquiring companies (Jacobsen, 2014). This probability of overconfident CEOs overpay-
ing for the acquisition is a result of two manifestations of overconfidence which are miscalibra-
tion and ‘’better-than-average’’ effect.  
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Therefore, the second research question is ‘’as long as overconfident CEOs are more inclined 
to do multiple mergers than their rational counterparts, the mergers will be value destroying to 
shareholders measured by the market reaction around deal announcement’’. 
The null hypothesis H3 is ‘’Multiple mergers made by overconfident CEOs will receive more 
negative market reaction at deal announcement’’. 
If the null hypothesis is rejected, the alternative hypothesis H4 is ‘’Multiple mergers made by 
overconfident CEOs will receive about the same or more positive market reaction at deal an-
nouncement’’. 
3.3. Differences in research questions between Malmendier and Tate (2008) and this 
thesis 
There are two ways to measure overconfidence in Malmendier and Tate (2008). One of the 
methods is to measure overconfidence proxy from press release. Press may describe CEOs as 
overconfidence by using words such as confident and optimistic, or as non-overconfidence by 
using words such as reserved and cautious. From the collected group of CEOs from press, Mal-
mendier and Tate (2008) find their M&A deals and their results. The authors use them as the 
sample for regression later. By that way, the sample size of Malmendier and Tate (2008) in-
cludes both CEOs making no acquisition, CEOs making one acquisition and CEOs making 
multiple acquisitions.  
But in this thesis, I employ a different approach to collect my sample. I first collect M&A deals 
that satisfy the criteria about the country origin, deal completeness, deal size, etc. Then I retrieve 
the information of the CEOs working in the company while the M&A deals occur. I use Mal-
mendier and Tate (2008)’s definition of overconfident CEOs to classify the CEOs in the sample. 
By approaching the data from this way, my sample size includes CEOs making an acquisition 
and CEOs making multiple acquisitions. My sample size doesn’t include CEOs making no ac-
quisition as in Malmendier and Tate (2008). Therefore, the research questions in the original 
article focus on the likelihood of CEOs making single acquisition (when their sample size in-
cludes CEOs making no acquisition) and their M&A results. My research questions focus on 
the likelihood of CEOs making multiple acquisitions (when my sample size includes CEOs 
making an acquisition and multiple acquisitions) and their M&A results.  
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4. Data 
4.1. Sample selection 
4.1.1. Event data 
I extract our acquisition sample from Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S. Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. The database provides a platform specifically to retrieve merger and 
acquisition related information. I choose the time period between January 1, 2006 and Decem-
ber 31, 2013 because in Execucomp, Compustat, the option holding information of CEO is only 
available for the time period. Malmendier and Tate (2008) use private data so that they can 
collect a vast range of time period for option holding data from 1980 to 1994. I identify 956 
acquisitions made by 728 firms between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2013 that meet the 
following criteria: 
a. Acquirer nation is US. 
b. Acquirer public status is public. 
c. The acquisition is completed. 
d. The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target’s shares before the announcement and 
owns 100% of the target’s shares after the transaction. 
e. The deal is not classified as acquisition of partial interest, acquisition of remaining 
interest, repurchase and recapitalization. 
f. Acquisition techniques are not classified as bankruptcy acquisition, leveraged buyout 
and self-tender. 
g. The deal is not classified as going privates. 
h. The deal value disclosed in SDC is more than $50 million and is at least 1% of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity on the 11th trading day before the announcement date.  
In SDC, I obtain the following variables. They are deal announcement date, acquirer name, 
target name, acquirer CUSIP, acquirer and target industry SIC codes, transaction value, target 
public status and method of payment. The companies retrieved from merger and acquisition 
deals from SDC will serve as a basis sample for my data retrieval since it contains specific event 
date information. 
4.1.2. Stock market and accounting data 
After obtaining the event data from SDC Platinum, I use CRSP to extract stock market data that 
is necessary in my thesis. CRSP accumulates historical US stock market data from 1926 to date, 
and is a worldwide database used in financial research. From the database, I collect monthly 
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stock price of my sample companies. I use SDC company CUSIP code as an identifier to look 
up for information in CRSP. Before being able to use the same CUSIP code between the two 
databases, I transform CUSIP code in CRSP from 9 digits into 6 digits to make them consistent 
in the two sources. I end up with 159,884 monthly observations from CUSIP for 728 firms from 
2006 to 2013. I calculate the average-calendar-monthly stock price of the sample firms from 
CRSP and assume it to be their fiscal-year-end stock price. For each company, only one entry 
is kept for one year (the average-calendar-monthly stock price). Other monthly stock price en-
tries of a year are then eliminated. The same fiscal-year-end stock price with the acquisition 
date is used to calculate Tobin’s q of which formula is following Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) 
and specified in Appendix. 
In addition to stock market data, certain accounting items are used in the regression analysis in 
my thesis. The accounting data is retrieved from Compustat data source which maintains a 
global report of financial, statistical and market information from 1950 to date. I use Compustat 
to collect the following accounting information, i.e. total assets, common equity, number of 
common shares outstanding, debt in current liabilities and long term debt to calculate Tobin’s 
q and firm leverage. The formula to calculate the above indicators are reported in the Appendix 
1. For the set of sample firms, I retrieve annual calendar-year-end data. I apply the same method 
as extracting stock market data from CRSP by transforming CUSIP identifier to obtain firms 
consistently reported with SDC Platinum.  
In addition to stock market and accounting information data to calculate the control variables 
in my thesis, I retrieve daily stock prices of the sample firms from Thomson to calculate the 
dependent variable in my analysis (cumulative abnormal stock return). I also obtain daily stock 
prices of S&P 500 from Thomson (Ritter, 1991). The reason that I choose Thomson to extract 
daily stock prices to calculate this dependent variable is that Thomson integrated interface in 
Excel customizes itself for various-day stock price retrieval systematically whereas CRSP does 
not. Thomson uses 8-digit-CUSIP to classify companies. Thus, I have to adjust 9-digit-CUSIP 
company list of SDC into 8-digit-code before being able to retrieve from Thomson.  
Matching the data collected from different databases proves to be a straightforward task thanks 
to the CUSIP identifiers and choosing a database as a benchmark in the first place. Since I use 
the sample companies from SDC as the basis sample, first I match stock market data and ac-
counting information data from each of the sources CRSP, Compustat and Thomson with SDC 
with the common CUSIP identifiers. For instance, I have 2127 matched observations between 
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SDC and Compustat, 1998 matched observations between SDC and CRSP, 957 matched ob-
servations between SDC and Thomson. After that, I sync all the data together. Observations 
with missing values in any of the mentioned database will be removed from the final sample. I 
also examine the data and remove observations with extreme values. If eliminating missing 
values and outliers, the final data consists of 622 mergers made by 306 acquirers during the 
sample period.  
4.2. Summary statistics 
In figure 1, there are a total number of 622 mergers in the sample. The merger trend in the 
sample was increasing during 2006 and 2007. During that time, there was a strong economic 
boom. In 2008 and 2009, the merger activity plunged severely due to the financial crisis and 
economic recession. Later on from 2010 and 2013, as the economy recovered, the merger ac-
tivity saw an increasing trend again. 
In figure 2, there are 491 deals made by overconfident CEOs while there are only 131 deals 
made by non-overconfident CEOs. The number of mergers made by overconfident CEOs is 
3.75 times of that by non-overconfident CEOs. Interestingly, in 2009 where the economic situ-
ation was bad, the ratio of the number of mergers made by overconfident CEO was about 6 
times of that by non-overconfident CEOs. From 2008 to 2009, when non-overconfident CEOs 
reduced merger activity by half compared to the previous year, overconfident CEOs kept mer-
ger activity about the same level compared to the previous year. 
Table 1 is the summary statistics of some variables for non-overconfident CEOs and overcon-
fident CEOs. Non-overconfident CEOs prefer to finance the mergers by stock. The mean of 
Some Stock dummy variable is 0.4046 for non-overconfident CEOs compared to 0.2444 for 
overconfident CEOs. Overconfident CEOs prefer to finance the mergers by cash. The mean of 
Cash Only dummy variable is 0.3359 for non-overconfident CEOs while it is 0.5886 for over-
confident CEOs. Both of the cognitive bias and rational CEOs seem to have a similar preference 
in choosing target that shares the same industry. 
Table 2 is summary statistics of cumulative abnormal return for 11-day event window around 
deal announcement CAR (-5, +5) variables for overconfident and non-overconfident CEOs 
from 2006 to 2013. It is notably interesting that most of the time mean of CAR (-5, +5) for 
rational CEOs is lower than mean of CAR (-5, +5) for overconfident CEOs. For instance, mean 
of CAR (-5, +5) for the rational counterparts is -0.0197 while mean of CAR (-5, +5) for over-
confident CEOs is -0.0073 in 2006. The rest of the 7 years in the sample period experience the 
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same tendency except for the year 2010. In 2010, mean of CAR (-5, +5) for overconfident CEOs 
is 0.0261 and mean of CAR (-5, +5) for non-overconfident CEOs is 0.0474. 
Table 3 is the summary statistics of dependent and independent variables for all CEOs. There 
is a great difference in acquirer size between my sample and Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s 
sample. While the average acquirer size in Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s is 5979.06 million 
USD, the average acquirer size in my sample is about four time greater, which is 25189.9 mil-
lion USD. In other words, acquirers in my sample are very large companies compared to the 
average company in the former researchers’ merger pool. On the other hand, Tobin’s q in the 
two sample is about the same. Tobin’s q in my sample is 1.808 compared to 1.42 in Malmendier 
and Tate (2008)’s sample. Merger bid related variables in my sample are similar to Malmendier 
and Tate (2008)’s sample. For example, relatedness variable is almost the same in the two sam-
ples. Relatedness is 0.371 in my sample compared to 0.386 in the original article. There are 
more diversifying mergers than same-industry mergers in my sample. Furthermore, mean of 
CAR (-1, +1) is -0.003 in Malmendier and Tate (2008)’s sample compared to -0.009 for CAR 
(-3, +3) in my sample. Negative CAR (-3, +3) in the sample means that on average merger deal 
announcements are responded unfavorably by the market. In addition, negative CAR (-3, +3) 
means that on average mergers destroy acquiring shareholders’ value. 
Table 4 is the correlation coefficient of portfolio measures. 
 
5. Methodology 
5.1. Likelihood of overconfidence CEOs making acquisitions: Logit analysis 
The first stage of the analysis which is whether or not overconfident CEOs are more likely to 
do mergers during the sample period is investigated using a binary choice logit model. The 
purpose is to verify the result of previous literature that overconfident CEOs are more acquisi-
tive than the rational counterparts (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). While Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) study the likelihood of overconfident CEOs making single acquisition (the sample size 
includes CEOs with some acquisitions and CEOs with no acquisition), this thesis studies the 
likelihood of overconfident CEOs making multiple acquisitions (the sample size contains CEOs 
with at least one acquisition). In the logit model, maximum likelihood estimation is used to 
evaluate the determinants of the probability of CEOs making at least a merger in one year. Logit 
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estimation with multiple explanatory variables hypothesizes that the probability of a given oc-
currence is determined by the standardized normal distribution: 
𝑝 = 𝐹 (𝑍𝑖) 
where 𝑍𝑖 is based on the following linear function: 
𝑍𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦
+  𝛽10𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑 
where 
𝑍𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals one for an identified manager making at least one acquisition 
in a year and is zero otherwise 
Overconfidence is a dummy variable that equals one for a CEO that holds an option that is at 
least 40% in the money entering its final year and is zero otherwise 
Relatedness is a dummy variable that equals one for the target sharing the first two numbers in 
the SIC code with the acquirer and is zero otherwise 
Subsidiary target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a subsidiary and is 
zero otherwise 
Public target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a public company and is 
zero otherwise 
Private target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a private company and 
is zero otherwise 
Log acquirer size is the logarithmic transformation of acquirer size 
Leverage is the leverage of the acquirer and equals sum of debt in current liabilities and long 
term debt of acquirer 
Tobin’s q is the ratio between market value of assets over book value of assets of acquiring 
company 
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Cash only is a dummy variable and that equals one for the merger financed by cash only and is 
zero otherwise 
Partially stock financed is a dummy variable that equals one for the merger financed by a com-
bination of cash and stock or by stock only and is zero otherwise 
5.2. Announcement abnormal return by overconfident CEOs: Multivariate analysis 
The second stage in examining the general impact of overconfidence on shareholder value cre-
ation, particular by the market response to the deal announcement effect, is based on a multi-
variate approach. There is a significant difference in the choice of the model to analyze the 
effect of overconfidence on value creation for shareholders in this paper and the original paper 
by Malmendier and Tate (2008). In the original paper, the authors choose random and fixed 
effect models. The advantage of the random and fixed effect models is that any time-invariant 
variable that has an effect on the dependent variable (which is the value creation measured by 
market response in this case) is eliminated from the models. The disadvantage of the random 
and fixed effect models is that the models require that to be included in the sample a company 
must have at least one non-overconfident CEO and one overconfident CEO, or one non-over-
confident CEO who later switches to be overconfident during the sample period (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2008). That condition shrinks the sample size considerably. Due to the already rela-
tively small sample size of 622 observations without missing values compared with 3911 ob-
servations in the original article, I choose to examine the relationship between the two main 
interested variable by multivariate regression.  
The multivariate model is a linear function which includes the interested dependent variable, 
interested independent variable and control variables. It has the form of: 
𝐺𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +  𝛽2𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 +  𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
+  𝛽4𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 +  𝛽6𝐿𝑜𝑔 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+  𝛽7𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽8𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛
′𝑠 𝑞 + 𝛽9𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑂𝑛𝑙𝑦
+  𝛽10𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  
where  
𝐺𝑖 is cumulative abnormal return around deal announcement. This variable is calculated based 
on event study method and is discussed in the later section.   
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Overconfidence is a dummy variable that equals one for a CEO that holds an option that is at 
least 40% in the money entering its final year and is zero otherwise 
Relatedness is a dummy variable that equals one for the target sharing the first two numbers in 
the SIC code with the acquirer and is zero otherwise 
Subsidiary target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a subsidiary and is 
zero otherwise 
Public target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a public company and is 
zero otherwise 
Private target is a dummy variable that equals one for the target being a private company and 
is zero otherwise 
Log acquirer size is the logarithmic transformation of acquirer size 
Leverage is the leverage of the acquirer and equals sum of debt in current liabilities and long 
term debt of acquirer 
Tobin’s q is the ratio between market value of assets over book value of assets of acquiring 
company 
Cash only is a dummy variable and that equals one for the merger financed by cash only and is 
zero otherwise 
Partially stock financed is a dummy variable that equals one for the merger financed by a com-
bination of cash and stock or by stock only and is zero otherwise 
5.3. Explanations of the variables in the two models 
Before going to regress the above formula, it is necessary to understand how the variables are 
constructed. This section will begin with how the dependent variable is formulated, then how 
the independent variable is built and finally how the control variables are produced.  
5.3.1. Dependent variable 
I will discuss in this section how I construct cumulative abnormal return variable using event 
study method. 
- Event study method 
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Following Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997), Mackinlay (1997), Ball and Torous (1988), 
Brown and Warner (1985) and Thompson (1985), I conduct an event study using the market 
model to estimate cumulative abnormal return around announcement date of US acquirers in 
the sample. 
 
The abnormal return to acquiring company j on day t (𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡) is given by: 
𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 =  𝑅𝑗𝑡 − (𝛼 ?^? +  𝛽^𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the stock return to company j at day t 
𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the stock return for market at day t. In this case I follow Dennis et al (2003) and use S&P 
500 return 
 𝛼 ?^? and 𝛽^𝑗 are the estimates of the market model using 120 day estimation window. To be 
precise, the estimation window is from day 150 prior to the announcement date to day 31 prior 
to the deal announcement date. Market model formula is 
𝑅𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 denotes the actual stock return to company j at day t,  
𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the market return for S&P 500 at day t,  
𝛼𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽𝑗 are coefficients of the market model  
𝜀𝑗𝑡 is the model’s error term.  
Cumulative abnormal return for company j for (𝑡1, t) event window which means from day 𝑡1 
prior to the announcement date to day t after the announcement date is: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡 =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑡
𝑡1
 
5.3.2. Independent variable 
- Overconfidence 
I construct overconfidence variable based on option holding behavior since previous literature 
have shown a strong correlation between overconfidence and CEOs’ late exercise tendency 
despite their options being deep in the money (Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Huang and Kisgen, 
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2013; Chen, Ho, Ho, 2014). Before analyzing how previous articles measure overconfidence, 
it is essential to acquire knowledge about background of CEO incentive based compensation 
and optimal timing to exercise an executive option. 
First of all, overconfident CEOs receive compensation differently from non-overconfident 
CEOs. For instance, flatter compensation contracts with more weight on performance based 
compensation can make overconfident CEOs better off given that they have moderate levels of 
overconfidence and the compensation automatically adjusts to reflect outside opportunities. Yet, 
‘’too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him or her to accept 
highly convex compensation contracts that expose him or her to excessive risk’’ (Gervais, Hea-
ton and Odean, 2011). Besides, it is common that overconfidence CEOs receive statistically 
significantly less total compensation than their rational colleagues. Since board recognizes 
overconfident CEOs from their option exercising and forecast issuance behaviors, board takes 
advantage of overconfident CEOs by designing incentive contract (Otto, 2014). For instance, 
overconfident CEOs receive more option intensive compensation than non-overconfident CEOs. 
(Humphery, Lisic, Nanda and Silveri, 2014). To sum up, characteristics of CEOs are exploited 
by board. Risk averse CEOs are better off than excessive overconfident CEOs in terms of re-
muneration. 
In this light, it seems natural to discuss about incentive contract of executive compensation. 
Executive options have ‘’10-year lives, are granted at the money, and gradually vest to become 
exercisable over three or four years’’ (Ofek and Yermack, 2000). Merton (1973) suggests that 
investors should not exercise options early, especially European call options, because time 
value is nonnegative for non-dividend paying stocks. However, the argument is not valid for 
executive option. Option pricing formulas are based on the assumption that the riskiness of the 
option’s payoff can be perfectly hedged by constantly and costlessly modifying a portfolio 
composed of call options, common shares of stock, and riskless bonds over time. An inability 
to diversify the firm-specific component of his firm’s stock return will affect the manager’s 
valuation of any payoff since executive options are non-tradable, and CEOs cannot hedge le-
gally the risk of their holdings by short selling company stock. Besides, CEOs invest their hu-
man capital into the company and receive equity based compensation. As a result, much of the 
investment of CEOs is concentrated on the performance of company stock price. Therefore, a 
risk-averse CEO should exercise options early if the stock price is sufficiently high (Lambert, 
Larcker and Verrecchia, 1991; Hall and Murphy, 2002). 
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Hall and Murphy (2002) develop a model of which 40% is the threshold for the increase in 
option price that rational CEOs should exercise their options. The model assumptions are that 
CEOs have a constant relative risk aversion of three and that 67% of their wealth is in the firm’s 
stock. Therefore, longholder is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 (overconfidence) if 
CEOs keep an option until the year of expiration although that option was at least 40% in-the-
money entering its final year. Yet, at the same time, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that the 
particular choice of parameter values does not affect their results. They construct another vari-
able, holder 67 in which CEOs fail to exercise their option entering its final year despite 67% 
in-the-money of the option. The holder 67 variable is as robust as long holder variable using 
the 40% in-the-money threshold. 
The limitation of longholder variable is that it may cause forward-looking bias. For example, 
consider a CEO with a tenure from 2006 to 2013. If the CEO is categorized as risk averse from 
2006 to 2012 since he always exercises options early as long as they are vested. But in 2013 for 
the first time he keeps an option until expiration even though the option is at least 40% in-the-
money. If applying the definition of longholder on the CEO, the CEO is named as overconfi-
dence from 2006 to 2013 (Chen, Ho and Ho, 2014). To cover for the possible bias in the long 
holder variable, Malmendier and Tate (2008) construct another variable, postlongholder. Post-
longholder classifies CEOs as overconfident only after the year that they for the first time keep 
an option that ever exceeded 40% in-the-money until expiration. However, due to the scope of 
this thesis, only longholder variable which follows Malmendier and Tate (2008) is formulated 
for regression later. 
5.3.3. Control variables 
In this section I will elaborate on the chosen control variables following the previous literature. 
a. Leverage 
Jensen (1986) explains the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows. Addi-
tional debt improves efficiency by forcing organizations with large cash flows but few high-
return investment projects. The debt helps prevent such firms from wasting resources on low 
return projects. Leverage also provides incentives for managers to boost firm performance, 
since managers have to transfer significant control to creditors and often lose their jobs if their 
firms fall into financial distress according to Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). 
b. Acquirer size 
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Moeller, Schkingemann and Stulz (2004) find the announcement return for acquiring firm 
shareholders is approximately two percentage points greater for small acquirers regardless of 
the form of financing and whether the acquired firm is public or private. The size effect is robust 
to firm and deal characteristics, and it is not reversed over time. One of the explaining hypoth-
esis is managers of bidding firms may suffer from hubris by Roll (1986). On the other hand, 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) explains the acquirer size effect by managerialism. Large firm 
size serves as a very effective takeover defense, since it takes more capital to acquire a larger 
target. Thus, they expect that managers of larger firms are more entrenched and more likely to 
make value detrimental acquisitions. 
c. Tobin’s q 
Lang, Stulz and Walking (1991) in a sample of successful tender offers, find a positive corre-
lation that is firms with higher q values receive more favorable announcement effect. Firms 
with high cash flow and a low Tobin’s q destroy shareholder's wealth because ‘’the price paid 
for the target reflects synergies available only to competing bidders’’ (Lang, Stulz and Walking, 
1991). It could probably be because the acquisition reveals negative information about bidder's 
management or investment opportunities.  Servaes (1991) confirms the result in a sample of 
takeover deals. However, Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) find a negative relation of 
Tobin’s q and returns in a comprehensive sample. 
d. Market relatedness 
The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies in M&A as docu-
mented in Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990). Moreover, self-interested managerial objectives 
can drive bad acquisitions. DePamphilis (2014) says ‘’most successful mergers in developed 
countries are those that focus on deals that promote the acquirer's core business, largely reflect-
ing their familiarity with such businesses and their ability to optimize investment decision’’. 
Related acquisitions may even be more likely to generate greater announcement return than 
unrelated acquisitions, since related firms are more likely to be able to realize operational cost 
saving due to overlapping departments and product lines than unrelated firms. Two firms are in 
the same industry if the target and the acquirer share the same first two digit SIC code (Ritter, 
1991). 
e. Target public status 
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Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller (2002) show results implying bidder shareholders gain when pur-
chasing a private firm or a subsidiary but lose when acquiring a public firm. When bidders 
acquire private firms or subsidiaries, they are purchasing assets in a relatively illiquid market. 
Thus, the valuation of those assets exhibits a liquidity discount, resulting in a greater return to 
bidder shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1980) find that shareholders of public firms get a 
better deal when their firm is acquired than the shareholders of private firms do. 
f. Method of payment 
DePamphilis (2014) documents in the US, ‘’all equity financed takeovers of public firms fre-
quently exhibit negative abnormal returns and underperform all-cash bids’’. Myers and Majluf 
(1984) build a model to show that the equity payment indicates overvaluation of the acquirers. 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find the return is positive if the acquiring firm offers 
stock to private and subsidiary targets. The high return may result from tax consideration and 
monitoring benefits. If target owners receive stock to compensate for their ownership stake, the 
owners delay their tax liability. In addition, if the stock transfer results in a large blockholder 
in the bidding firm, the bidder shareholders may receive value from ability of that owner to 
monitor the activities of the firm. 
 
6.  Empirical results  
In this chapter I introduce the empirical results of my thesis. The empirical methodology, its 
reasons and used data are addressed in detail above in Data and Methodology, along with two 
suggested research questions. This chapter is began with introducing the outcomes and indica-
tions of the empirical analyses. Then I continue by evaluating the robustness of my findings. I 
end this chapter by addressing my results and linking them with the previous literature.  
6.1. Result for hypothesis 1 - the likelihood of overconfident CEOs making acquisitions 
The first research question is about what is the net effect of their misestimating of the costs and 
benefits of a merger investment. Their constrained perception on their firm being undervalued 
and external finance being expensive on the willingness to undertake acquisitions can also 
change the net effect. The null hypothesis H1 was that overconfident CEOs are not more likely 
to make multiple acquisitions than their rational counterparts. The alternate hypothesis H2 was 
29 
 
that overconfident CEOs are more likely to make multiple acquisitions than their counterparts. 
The logistic model was used to examine which hypothesis is true in this thesis. 
Overall, I find no statistically significant relationship between overconfidence and the likeli-
hood to carry on multiple mergers and acquisitions between 2006 and 2013. Although the z 
statistics for overconfidence variable is positive (0.66) which proves a slightly positive ten-
dency in the examined relationship, it is clear that it is not highly positive enough to be statis-
tically significant. Thus, the null hypothesis H1 that overconfident CEOs are not more likely to 
make multiple acquisitions than their counterparts is accepted. 
Still, if I take a closer look at the data by dividing the sample into 2 subsamples which include 
one subsample of the financial crisis 2008 and 2009 and another subsample without the finan-
cial crisis from 2006 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2013, the results change. In the first sub sample 
between 2008 and 2009, coefficient for Overconfidence variable is 1.6444 and is statistically 
significant at 10%. In the second subsample from 2006 to 2013 except for the economic down-
turn time, coefficient for overconfidence is negative but not highly negative enough to be sta-
tistically significant. The results show that overall overconfident CEOs are not more likely to 
make multiple acquisitions than their peers but during the economic downturn overconfident 
CEOs are more likely to make multiple acquisitions than the rational CEOs. Explanations for 
the findings will be addressed in Discussion. 
6.2. Results for hypothesis 2 – announcement abnormal return of overconfident CEOs 
The second research question is to verify the literature that if overconfident CEOs are more 
willing to make multiple acquisitions than their colleagues, their mergers will receive more 
negative market response around deal announcement. The null hypothesis H3 is multiple mer-
gers made by overconfident CEOs will receive more negative market reaction at deal announce-
ment. The alternative hypothesis H4 is multiple mergers made by overconfident CEOs will 
receive about the same or more positive market reaction at merger announcement. OLS multi-
variate regression was employed to find the true hypothesis. 
In contrast to previous research, I find positive and statistically significant between overconfi-
dence variable and cumulative abnormal return around multiple merger announcements. T sta-
tistics for overconfidence variable is 2.40 and the t statistics is significant at 5%. Therefore, the 
alternative hypothesis H4 is accepted. Multiple mergers made by overconfident CEOs received 
favorable market reaction at deal announcement. However, model R squared is only 0.0404 so 
any interpretation of the result should be taken carefully. 
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When taking closer investigation at the result by dividing the whole period from 2006 to 2013 
into 2 subgroups, one from 2008 to 2009, another from 2006 to 2013 except for 2008 and 2009, 
many interesting outcomes can be drawn from. For the first subgroup from 2008 to 2009, over-
confidence is positively related to the cumulative abnormal return CAR (-5, +5) and the result 
is statistically significant at 5%. The model R squared is also much improved than the previous 
model at 37%.  For the second subgroup of the rest of the years in the sample period, overcon-
fidence is positively related to market response around multiple deal announcement but t sta-
tistics is too small to be statistically significant. The R squared for this model is minimal at 
4.70% only, which requires careful interpretation of the variables in the model. Therefore, it is 
concluded that overall overconfidence doesn't have an effect on the market response at multiple 
merger announcements during 2006 and 2013 except for 2008 and 2009. Only during the eco-
nomic downturn, overconfidence is positively related to market response at multiple deal an-
nouncements. The statistically significant result found in the period between 2006 and 2013 
was biasedly influenced by the outcome of the financial crisis period. Leaving the financial 
crisis alone, the outcome of the relationship between overconfidence and market reaction at 
merger announcements is insignificant. The reasons for the above results will be evaluated in 
the Discussion section. 
6.3. Further analysis 
I choose to make further investigation for the relationship between the variable of interest 
(Overconfidence) and dependent variable (CAR (-5, +5)) between 2008 and 2009 to understand 
more about its characteristics. I suspect that the regression coefficient of Overconfidence vari-
able predicting CAR (-5, +5) would be higher for related deals than for diversifying deals since 
previous literature documents that abnormal return at announcement is higher for related deals 
than for diversifying deals (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). Therefore, I divide the sub 
group of 2008 and 2009 into two smaller groups. One group consists of related deals only and 
another group includes diversifying deals. Then I run the multivariate regression model for each 
of the group. On the contrary to my belief, the result shows that the Overconfidence variable is 
a stronger predictor of CAR (-5, +5) for diversifying deals (0.1166) than for related deals 
(0.0047). To test whether the difference between the two overconfidence coefficients in each 
group is statistically significant, I construct an interaction variable which equals Overconfi-
dence * Relatedness. If the coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically significant, I 
interpret that the null hypothesis that the coefficient for overconfident CEOs in related deals 
equals the coefficient for overconfident CEOs in diversifying deals is rejected. In Table 12, I 
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find the coefficient of the interaction variable is statistically significant at 5%. Therefore, I can 
conclude that Overconfidence is a stronger predictor for positive abnormal returns in diversify-
ing deals than in related deals and possible reasons are discussed in the Discussion. 
6.4. Robustness check 
To further test the newly found result, I run the same multivariate regression between overcon-
fidence variable and cumulative abnormal return CAR (-30, 30) and CAR (-3, 3) controlled for 
other possible factors that may have an effect on the relationship in two subgroups. One sub-
group is between 2008 and 2009 and another subgroup is between 2006 and 2013 except for 
2008 and 2009. In the former subgroup between 2008 and 2009, it is interesting to note that the 
result for the long term effect of overconfidence on market reaction CAR (-30, 30) is positive 
but the t statistic is too small to be statistically significant.  
The reason for insignificant investigated relationship for the 61-day event window will be ex-
plained as follow. It has been empirically demonstrated that a short event window will usually 
capture the significant effect of an event (Ryngaert and Netter, 1990). Mitchell and Netter (1989) 
found that the stock market reacted within 90 minutes to news wire stories announcing proposed 
federal tax legislation. Because it is much more difficult to control for confounding effects when 
long windows are used, an event window should be as short as possible. It should be long 
enough to capture the significant effect of the event, but short enough to exclude confounding 
effects (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997). Thus, one can argue that the market response to over-
confidence is statistically significant in 2008 and 2009. Although the relationship for the 61-
day event window is insignificant, it can happen because that event window is too long to ex-
amine this relationship. 
Apparently, the result for the short term effect of the cognitive bias variable on market response 
at multiple merger announcement CAR (-3, 3) confirms the conclusion that overall overconfi-
dence doesn’t have a statistically significant impact on the market reaction to the multiple mer-
ger announcements. In the first regression for the former subgroup between 2008 and 2009, the 
result for the short term effect of the cognitive bias variable on market response at multiple 
merger announcement CAR (-3, 3) is positive and statistically significant at 5%. In the second 
regression for the later subgroup between 2006 and 2013 except for 2008 and 2009, overconfi-
dence doesn’t have a statistically significant effect on the abnormal stock returns around mul-
tiple merger dates. In the third regression for the whole period between 2006 and 2013, the 
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relationship between overconfidence variable and CAR (-3, +3) is positive and statistically sig-
nificant at 10%. R squared result for the first regression between 2008 and 2009 is 34.62% 
whereas R squared result for the third regression between 2006 and 2013 is insignificant at 
4.19%. The t statistics and R squared result verify the conclusion that overconfidence only has 
a statistically significant effect on market reaction during the financial crisis. The variable of 
interest doesn’t influence the dependent variable in the overall period. 
 
7. Discussion 
I divide this discussion of results in two parts to differentiate the main findings between the two 
study periods. One is between 2006 and 2013 except for the financial crisis. Another is between 
2008 and 2009.  
7.1. From 2006 to 2013 except for 2008 and 2009 
7.1.1. The first research question: The likelihood of overconfident CEOs making multiple ac-
quisitions 
The model indicators for the likelihood of overconfident CEOs making multiple acquisitions 
compared to non-overconfident CEOs doing multiple mergers is insignificant. This result is 
different with Malmendier and Tate (2008)'s outcome which presents evidence that overconfi-
dent CEOs are more acquisitive than their rational colleagues in single deal. There is one ex-
planation for the result of my thesis. The explanations is presented as follow. 
As mentioned earlier, the chance of overconfident CEOs doing multiple mergers depends on 
two manifestations of overconfidence. The first manifestation is that overconfident CEOs mis-
perceive the costs and benefits of the investment. They believe the investment is more profitable 
than it actually is. This manifestation is called miscalibration (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
This miscalibration increases the chance that acquisition deals are made by overconfident CEOs. 
On the other hand, overconfident CEOs also believe that their firms are undervalued by the 
market. If overconfident CEOs must access external finance, they will be more reluctant to 
undertake the acquisitions. In that case, their inclination to do mergers persists if their perceived 
benefits of the acquisitions are greater than their perceived loss of borrowing debt or issuing 
new equity. This manifestation is named ''better-than-average'' effect. The two manifestations' 
outcome are two opposing forces on the chance of overconfident CEOs initiating multiple mer-
gers. 
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The model indicators show evidence for this explanation. In the logistic model for the study 
period between 2006 and 2013 except for two economic crisis years, variable leverage is sta-
tistically significant at 5%. The coefficient for the variable is 2.12 which means after applying 
the marginal effect formula, the marginal effect at the mean value of the leverage variable is 
0.2177 (Dougherty, 2002) (See appendix for calculation details).  In other words, at the sample 
mean, a one-point increase in leverage increases the probability of CEOs conducting multiple 
mergers by 21.77%. It is noteworthy that in this period I find that overconfident CEOs are not 
more likely to undertake multiple mergers than non-overconfident peers. However, in the 2008 
and 2009 period where overconfident CEOs are more acquisitive in multiple mergers than oth-
ers, leverage variable is statistically insignificant and it bears a negative sign instead of a posi-
tive sign. The varied results of leverage variable in the two periods are the evidence for the 
claim that overconfident CEOs believe their firms are undervalued and are not willing to use 
external finance. This claim is consistent with the findings of Malmendier and Tate (2005).  
Therefore it is possible that during 2006 and 2013 except for 2008 and 2009, overconfident 
CEOs are financially constrained. They don't have enough internal resources to finance the 
deals. In order to commence on M&As, they must obtain external finance in which the borrow-
ing costs undervalue their perceived value on their companies remarkably. Overconfident CEOs 
choose to forego the projects despite some misestimating that the benefits outweigh the costs 
of the projects. That is the first explanation for why overconfident CEOs are not more likely to 
do multiple mergers than their colleagues. 
7.1.2. The second research question: Announcement abnormal return of overconfident CEOs 
The multivariate regression model between overconfidence and cumulative abnormal returns 
in multiple mergers in both short and long time indicates a statistically insignificant relationship 
after controlling for confounding variables between 2006 and 2013 except for the economic 
downturn period. The result is inconsistent with Malmendier and Tate (2008)'s findings in sin-
gle merger which indicate that their single merger receive more negative abnormal returns than 
their rational counterpart' deals. Since overconfident CEOs are as much acquisitive as other 
CEOs in multiple mergers for the above reason in the previous section, they have sufficient 
resources of time and effort to invest in the projects. Furthermore, after Malmendier and Tate 
(2008)’s result is published, overconfidence in CEO may receive more attention from the board. 
With the help of a small and independent board, overconfident CEOs can improve on merger 
performance (Kolasinki and Li, 2013). Overconfident CEOs may realize their miscalibration 
and adjust their bias to value the deal synergies better. Thus, I hypothesize that with the external 
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help of a strong board, market reacts to the mergers by overconfident and non-overconfident 
CEOs in multiple mergers similarly.  
7.2. From 2008 to 2009 
7.2.1. The first research question: The likelihood of overconfident CEOs making multiple ac-
quisitions 
The logistic model indicate that overconfident CEOs are more likely to make multiple acquisi-
tions than non-overconfident CEOs during the economic crisis. Coefficient for Overconfidence 
variable is 1.6444 which means after applying the marginal effect formula, the marginal effect 
at the mean value of the overconfidence variable is 0.2002 (Dougherty, 2002) (See appendix 
for calculation details).  In other words, at the sample mean, a one-point increase in overconfi-
dence increases the probability of CEOs conducting multiple mergers by 20.02%. In the period 
from 2006 to 2013 except for 2008 and 2009, overconfidence coefficient is statically insignifi-
cant. The change of the variable of interest is a result of the change of the two opposing mani-
festations of overconfidence. The first manifestation is the miscalibration in which overconfi-
dent CEOs misevaluate the costs and benefits of the merger as discussed in section 7.1.1. The 
second manifestation is called ‘’better-than-average effect’’ where CEOs believe market un-
dervalues their firm, therefore, try to avoid external finance to not destroy their shareholder’s 
value (Malmendier and Tate, 2008).  
If the first manifestation is greater than the second manifestation, the net effect will be an in-
creasing probability for overconfident CEOs to initiate a merger. I cannot measure the first 
manifestation but I can measure the second manifestation based on leverage variable. Indeed, 
the second manifestation of overconfidence on the likelihood of M&A has decreased. In this 
period between 2008 and 2009, coefficient for leverage is -2.8810. Although it is not statisti-
cally significant, the coefficient implies a negative relationship between leverage and the like-
lihood to undertake multiple acquisitions. In the previous period between 2006 and 2013 except 
for 2008 and 2009, the coefficient for leverage is 2.12. It is statistically significant and hints a 
positive relationship between leverage and probability of commencing multiple M&A deals. If 
we assume the first manifestation of overconfidence remains the same in the two period, a de-
crease in the second manifestation between the two periods will increase the chance of over-
confident CEOs conducting multiple mergers. Therefore, overconfident CEOs do not use much 
of leverage in the investment decisions. To conclude, during the financial crisis, overconfident 
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CEOs have more internal fund available to finance the acquisitions which increases their chance 
of making multiple mergers and the number of successful mergers.  
7.2.2. The second research question: Announcement abnormal return of overconfident CEOs 
The model presents a positive relationship between short term abnormal returns (CAR (-5, +5)) 
and overconfidence indicator in 2008 and 2009 only. This positive relationship is not present 
in any other period in this thesis. There are two main theories explaining for this result. One 
explanation is that investor sentiment during the volatile time causes this positive relation. An-
other explanation is that together with the monitor of a strong board, overconfident CEOs show 
their skills during the difficult time and receive positive reaction from the market. The differ-
ence of the two explanations is that in the first explanation, the abnormal return is because of 
the market irrationality not because of the superior skill of overconfident CEOs, while in the 
second explanation, the positive abnormal return is led by the superior skill of overconfident 
CEOs. Each explanation has its own merit; however, the investor sentiment has more merit 
from the theoretical point of view to be the reason for the investigated outcome. They are going 
to be analyzed in depth as follow. 
a. First explanation 
My first argument is based on Baker and Wurgler (2007)’s finding. According to the authors, 
stocks of low capitalization, younger, unprofitable, high volatility, non-dividend paying, growth 
companies, or stocks of firms in financial distress, are likely to be disproportionately sensitive 
to broad waves of investor sentiment. There is a possibility that overconfident CEOs miscali-
brate the costs and benefits of the mergers, especially diversifying mergers during the financial 
crisis. When the difficulty level of evaluation task is greater in the financial crisis compared to 
the normal time, overconfident CEOs are subject to overvalue the probability of success of the 
project (Suantak, Bolger and Ferrell, 1996). They misestimate the synergies generated by the 
diversifying mergers and are more likely to make diversifying deals (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). Yet, market at that moment was not in a good shape and easily affected by sentiment by 
companies or deals with high volatility (Baker and Wurgler, 2007). Therefore, market reacted 
to the news differently from it would normally. This leads to the higher abnormal returns in 
diversifying deals (0.1166) than in related deals (0.0047) of overconfident CEOs which are 
statistically significant at 5%.  
b. Second explanation 
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My second argument is that overconfident CEOs has superior skills such as willingness to take 
on risky projects. An overconfident CEO may ‘’end up capturing more economic surplus than 
an otherwise identical but rational manager’’ does since moderately overconfident CEOs miti-
gate the underinvestment problem of firms compared to rational risk-averse CEOs (Goel and 
Thakor, 2008). Moreover, ‘’they commit them to exert effort to learn about projects’’ (Gervais, 
Heaton and Odean, 2011). This leads to the fact that there are greater abnormal returns in di-
versifying deals than in related deals of overconfident CEOs in the regression model in Table 
11. Another benefit of overconfident CEOs is that one of overconfidence manifestation (the 
‘’better-than-average effect’’) can be changed. Kolasinki and Li (2013) suggest empirically that 
‘’outsider-dominated boards that are moderately sized attenuate the effect of CEO overconfi-
dence on making value destroying acquisitions’’. The strong board helps overconfident CEOs 
adjust their evaluation of their company’s true value to replace ‘’undervalued’’ as they would 
have believed. The improvement is further enhanced if recently the overconfident CEOs expe-
rience personal trading loss on their firm stock (Kolasinki and Li, 2013). This effect is very 
likely to occur because of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. It helps overconfident CEOs 
improve in their performance of mergers and acquisitions and generate more value for their 
shareholders. In return, market reacts more positively to deal announcements by overconfident 
CEOs. However, one may argue that if this superior skills of overconfident CEOs are true, why 
they only persist in the financial crisis and not after the crisis. Thus, the probability of this 
explanation to be the true reason behind the positive relationship between overconfidence and 
market reaction is not very high from a theoretical point of view.  
 
8. Conclusion 
Previous research has studied the effect of overconfidence on CEO decision making in corpo-
rate transactions. The researchers have found overconfidence makes manager more acquisitive 
and that characteristic is punished with negative abnormal return when the affected managers 
undertake an acquisition (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Compared to the original article on the 
subject, I find that overall overconfidence doesn’t have an effect on the likelihood of CEOs 
making multiple mergers using the more recent data from 2006 to 2013. Moreover, during that 
same period, the market react similarly and consistently to multiple merger announcements of 
overconfident CEOs and non-overconfident CEOs. One interesting observation is the above 
result is not true for the financial crisis period in 2008 and 2009. During the economic downturn, 
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overconfident CEOs are more likely to make multiple acquisitions than rational counterparts. 
Their deals also receive statistically significant positive market response compared to their 
peers’.  
The reason for the effect of overconfidence on the probability of doing multiple mergers being 
similar to their rational counterparts’ is that overconfident CEOs in my sample study seem to 
lack internal resource to fund for the investment activity. Because of the better-than-average 
effect, they are reluctant to use external finance. Overconfident CEOs believe their firms are 
already undervalued by the market. They don’t want to issue new debt or equity since it will 
make the mispricing become even bigger in their opinion. During the sub period 2008 and 2009, 
however, overconfident CEOs have access to abundant internal cash flow so that they can do 
mergers without the fear of further underestimating their firm value by using external resources. 
The evidence for this explanation is the change from positive to negative sign of coefficient of 
the leverage variable in the maximum likelihood model in the two periods. 
Regarding the difference in market response of Malmendier and Tate (2008) and my thesis 
during the normal economic cycle from 2006 to 2007 and from 2010 to 2013, it is probably 
because after the former study published its result, overconfident CEOs receive more help from 
the small and independent board to improve on their calibration ability. Besides, since my study 
focuses on multiple deals of overconfident CEOs and Malmendier and Tate (2008) choose to 
research about single deal of overconfident CEOs, the difference in the results is possible. 
There are two explaining hypotheses for overconfidence and the positive abnormal return of 
mergers during the financial crisis. Firstly I hypothesize that investor sentiment is high during 
highly volatile economic situations that they react to the same business news differently than 
normally they would. That explains why diversified deals made by overconfident CEOs re-
ceived positive abnormal returns while it should have received negative ones as in Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1990). Secondly I hypothesize that overconfident CEOs have valuable 
and superior skills on selecting multiple merger deals during financial crisis. Their skills are 
attributed to their moderately higher risk taking attitude compared to rational CEOs and with 
the help of the board and personal experience. I find the first hypothesis is more likely to happen 
than the second hypothesis. Further empirical evidence is in need to verify which hypothesis is 
the true reason for the observed relationship. 
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Limitations and Recommendation 
Intuitively one can argue the reason behind the decreasing coefficient for leverage in 2008 and 
2009 is due to the recent financial crisis. During that time, banking system was in deep trouble 
of underwriting significant amount of their assets. Therefore, banks couldn’t help finance the 
buying procedure for acquiring companies as they could normally. Thus, it is not necessarily 
true that the second manifestation of overconfidence is decreasing so that the net effect on the 
likelihood of overconfident CEOs going forward with mergers is increasing. That argument 
holds some validity and I suggest that further research is in need to prove the reasons behind 
the increasing probability of undertaking multiple M&As by overconfident CEOs during the 
financial crisis.  
Another limitation is the way Tobin’s q is measured in this thesis. According to Masulis, Wang 
and Xie (2007), Tobin’s q is measured using the fiscal year end stock price before the acquisi-
tion date. However, due to the scope of this thesis, Tobin’s q is measured using the fiscal year 
end stock price at the same year with the acquisition date. Thus, some of the Tobin’s q can be 
misevaluated.   
Unfortunately, this thesis scope isn’t large enough to show empirically which explanation for 
the positive relationship between deal announcement and overconfidence during the economic 
downturn is valid, whether it is the investor sentiment theory or the overconfident CEOs with 
risk taking attitude theory. Therefore, further research can dig deeper on this point to find the 
ultimate answer to this unexpected outcome of this study. For instance, one can collect investor 
sentiment proxy and add into the regression model to test the investor sentiment theory (Baker 
and Wurgler, 2007). Another example is that one can conduct a multivariate model controlled 
for the size of the board and whether board consists of mostly outsiders or insiders from the 
companies (Kolasinki and Li, 2013). By constructing more control variables regarding the 
board and CEOs’ personal trading result, one may gain interesting insight as to the question 
why the positive effects of the board and personal trading experience only persist in the finan-
cial crisis not after the crisis. 
Last but not least, I cannot use the random and fixed effect models because of the small sample 
size. Therefore, some of the time-invariant effects such as varied merger trend across industries 
and varied merger trend across different years, etc. that affect the dependent variable (market 
reaction) are not removed from the model. That partly explains why the R squared of the mul-
tivariate regression between overconfidence and market response during 2006 and 2013 except 
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for 2008 and 2009 is at 4%. Further study can collect a larger sample size to complement this 
thesis on that limitation.  
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Figure 1: Number of mergers across the sample period 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Number of mergers among non-overconfident and overconfident CEOs 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of some control variables for non-overconfident and over-
confident CEOs 
Relatedness is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer acquires a target which 
shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. Cash only is a 
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only. It 
takes a value of 0 otherwise. Some stock is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the 
bidder pays for the transaction involved stock. It takes a value of 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 Panel A. Non-overconfident CEO  
   
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Relatedness 0,3359 0,4741 0 1 
Cash only 0,3359 0,4741 0 1 
Some stock 0,4046 0,4927 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Panel B. Overconfident CEO  
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Relatedness 0,3809 0,4861 0 1 
Cash only 0,5886 0,4926 0 1 
Some stock 0,2444 0,4302 0 1 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of some dependent variables for non-overconfident and over-
confident CEOs 
CAR (-5, +5) is the cumulative abnormal return of 11 days around the deal announcement date. 
 
       
Panel A. Non-overconfident CEO 
Year Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2006 CAR (-5, +5) 15 -0,0197 0,0411 -0,0729 0,0742 
2007 CAR (-5, +5) 18 -0,0274 0,0476 -0,0981 0,0889 
2008 CAR (-5, +5) 13 -0,1007 0,1166 -0,2443 0,0587 
2009 CAR (-5, +5) 7 -0,076 0,0759 -0,1868 0,0264 
2010 CAR (-5, +5) 10 0,0474 0,1162 -0,1128 0,1863 
2011 CAR (-5, +5) 18 -0,0078 0,0776 -0,1219 0,1888 
2012 CAR (-5, +5) 3 -0,0087 0,0151 -0,0174 0,0087 
2013 CAR (-5, +5) 11 0,0057 0,0613 -0,0516 0,1044 
 
 
Panel B. Overconfident CEO 
Year Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2006 CAR (-5, +5) 61 -0,0073 0,0692 -0,2663 0,2363 
2007 CAR (-5, +5) 71 -0,0165 0,0749 -0,1672 0,2211 
2008 CAR (-5, +5) 33 -0,0694 0,0978 -0,2641 0,0418 
2009 CAR (-5, +5) 32 -0,0092 0,1206 -0,5382 0,113 
2010 CAR (-5, +5) 56 0,0261 0,0718 -0,154 0,171 
2011 CAR (-5, +5) 41 0,0019 0,103 -0,266 0,2328 
2012 CAR (-5, +5) 57 -0,0011 0,0947 -0,3407 0,196 
2013 CAR (-5, +5) 44 0,0299 0,0809 -0,0994 0,212 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of dependent and independent variables for all CEOs 
Relatedness is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer acquires a target which 
shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, otherwise 0. Public target is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target 
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Cash 
only is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash 
only, otherwise 0. Partially stock is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over 
book value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of assets. Acquirer size 
is market value of assets. Log acquirer size is logarithmic transformation of market value of 
assets. Overconfidence is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. The dependent variable CAR (-30, +30), CAR (-5, +5), CAR (-3, +3) is calculated 
based on the parameters estimated from (-150, -31). 
  Panel A. Deal related characteristics     
Variable Obs Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Relatedness 622 0,371 0,484 0 1 
Private target 622 0,129 0,335 0 1 
Public target 622 0,778 0,416 0 1 
Subsidiary target 622 0,088 0,284 0 1 
Cash only payment 622 0,535 0,499 0 1 
Partially stock payment 622 0,278 0,448 0 1 
 
 
  
Panel B. Acquirer related characteris-
tics     
Variable Obs Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Tobin Q 535 1,808 0,88 0,909 7,636 
Leverage 530 0,149 0,122 0 0,598 
Acquirer size 582 25189,9 50667,05 164,446 322334 
Log acquirer size 582 8,597 1,772 5,103 12,683 
Overconfidence 622 0,789 0,408 0 1 
 
 
Panel C. Cumulative abnormal return around deal announcement 
Variable Obs Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
CAR (-30,+30) 490 -0,012 0,199 -0,954 0,813 
CAR (-3,+3) 490 -0,009 0,082 -0,381 0,233 
CAR (-5,+5) 490 -0,007 0,089 -0,538 0,236 
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Table 4: Correlation of portfolio measures 
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Table 5: Probability that overconfident CEOs will make at least an acquisition a year from 2006 
to 2013 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -2.404951   1.593298    -1.51   0.131    -5.527758     .717855
1.dummymeth~8     .6787096   .3617437     1.88   0.061    -.0302949    1.387714
1.dummymeth~1     .6230073   .3108116     2.00   0.045     .0138278    1.232187
       tobinq     .3338642   .1309658     2.55   0.011      .077176    .5905524
     leverage     1.187657   .9758169     1.22   0.224    -.7249093    3.100222
logacquirer~e     .0577561   .0681045     0.85   0.396    -.0757263    .1912386
1.dummytarg~5    -.4421277   1.469458    -0.30   0.764    -3.322212    2.437956
1.dummytarg~4    -.8771511   1.450447    -0.60   0.545    -3.719975    1.965673
1.dummytarg~3    -.6352067   1.458655    -0.44   0.663    -3.494117    2.223704
1.relatedne~y     .4347404   .2108828     2.06   0.039     .0214178    .8480631
1.Overconfi~t     .1934038   .2925443     0.66   0.509    -.3799726    .7667801
                                                                               
dummyanyacq~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood = -283.85279                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0402
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0081
                                                  LR chi2(10)     =      23.81
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        510
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Table 6: Probability that overconfident CEOs will make at least an acquisition a year from 2008 
to 2009 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -4.476743   2.163786    -2.07   0.039    -8.717686   -.2358008
1.dummymeth~8     1.717639   1.195554     1.44   0.151    -.6256028    4.060881
1.dummymeth~1     1.207931   1.144715     1.06   0.291    -1.035668     3.45153
       tobinq     .6172303   .4886131     1.26   0.207    -.3404337    1.574894
     leverage    -2.881013   3.049688    -0.94   0.345    -8.858292    3.096265
logacquirer~e    -.0560357   .1611408    -0.35   0.728    -.3718659    .2597945
1.dummytarg~5            0  (empty)
1.dummytarg~4            0  (omitted)
1.dummytarg~3    -.5926416   .9875443    -0.60   0.548    -2.528193     1.34291
1.relatedne~y      1.25382   .5689979     2.20   0.028     .1386047    2.369035
1.Overconfi~t     1.644417   .9159165     1.80   0.073     -.150746    3.439581
                                                                               
dummyanyacq~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood = -43.449601                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1724
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0205
                                                  LR chi2(8)      =      18.10
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =         91
50 
 
Table 7: Probability that overconfident CEOs will make at least an acquisition a year from 2006 
to 2013 except for 2008 and 2009 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -2.380392   1.618487    -1.47   0.141    -5.552568    .7917833
1.dummymeth~8     .5036585   .3972192     1.27   0.205    -.2748769    1.282194
1.dummymeth~1     .5931235   .3304268     1.80   0.073    -.0545011    1.240748
       tobinq      .379227   .1413229     2.68   0.007     .1022391    .6562149
     leverage     2.121189   1.042854     2.03   0.042     .0772315    4.165146
logacquirer~e     .0683149    .077536     0.88   0.378    -.0836529    .2202827
1.dummytarg~5    -.0879649   1.472131    -0.06   0.952    -2.973289    2.797359
1.dummytarg~4    -.8770299   1.451275    -0.60   0.546    -3.721477    1.967417
1.dummytarg~3    -.4752094   1.463029    -0.32   0.745    -3.342694    2.392275
1.relatedne~y     .2136201   .2366968     0.90   0.367    -.2502972    .6775374
1.Overconfi~t    -.0726848   .3252717    -0.22   0.823    -.7102056     .564836
                                                                               
dummyanyacq~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
Log likelihood = -229.56959                       Pseudo R2       =     0.0464
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0135
                                                  LR chi2(10)     =      22.34
Logistic regression                               Number of obs   =        411
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Table 8: Multivariate models of cumulative abnormal return around deal announcements CAR 
(-5, +5) from 2006 to 2013 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -.0010266    .072668    -0.01   0.989    -.1438956    .1418424
1.dummymeth~8       .01674   .0152649     1.10   0.273    -.0132715    .0467515
1.dummymeth~1     .0157787   .0126177     1.25   0.212    -.0090283    .0405858
       tobinq    -.0124551   .0065198    -1.91   0.057    -.0252733     .000363
     leverage    -.0313967   .0458528    -0.68   0.494    -.1215455    .0587521
logacquirer~e     .0014972   .0031044     0.48   0.630    -.0046063    .0076006
1.dummytarg~5    -.0110596   .0676605    -0.16   0.870    -.1440836    .1219644
1.dummytarg~4    -.0265694   .0665055    -0.40   0.690    -.1573225    .1041837
1.dummytarg~3    -.0376363   .0669778    -0.56   0.574     -.169318    .0940453
1.relatedne~y    -.0155967   .0099317    -1.57   0.117    -.0351229    .0039296
1.Overconfi~t     .0298688   .0124363     2.40   0.017     .0054183    .0543192
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55             402     11      .09219    0.0404   1.647383   0.0914
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
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Table 9: Multivariate models of cumulative abnormal return around deal announcements CAR 
(-5, +5) from 2008 to 2009 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
  
                                                                               
        _cons    -.2391809   .0872206    -2.74   0.008    -.4131812   -.0651805
1.dummymeth~8     .0426352    .036516     1.17   0.247    -.0302123    .1154826
1.dummymeth~1     .0422465   .0310819     1.36   0.179    -.0197602    .1042532
       tobinq    -.0305164   .0220396    -1.38   0.171    -.0744841    .0134513
     leverage    -.2668403   .1312453    -2.03   0.046    -.5286674   -.0050131
logacquirer~e     .0155227   .0075073     2.07   0.042      .000546    .0304993
1.dummytarg~5            0  (omitted)
1.dummytarg~4     .0993346   .0418807     2.37   0.020     .0157849    .1828842
1.dummytarg~3     .1011268   .0485899     2.08   0.041     .0041925    .1980611
1.relatedne~y    -.0964513    .024045    -4.01   0.000    -.1444198   -.0484828
1.Overconfi~t     .0652843   .0264208     2.47   0.016     .0125763    .1179923
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55              79     10    .0964174    0.3701   4.504595   0.0001
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
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Table 10: Multivariate models of cumulative abnormal return around deal announcements 
CAR (-5, +5) from 2006 to 2013 except for 2008 and 2009 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons     .0081807   .0662262     0.12   0.902    -.1221257    .1384871
1.dummymeth~8     .0247673   .0154629     1.60   0.110    -.0056574     .055192
1.dummymeth~1     .0172415   .0125518     1.37   0.171    -.0074553    .0419383
       tobinq    -.0082465   .0062247    -1.32   0.186    -.0204941    .0040011
     leverage     .0264487   .0448919     0.59   0.556    -.0618804    .1147778
logacquirer~e    -.0019293   .0031299    -0.62   0.538    -.0080876    .0042291
1.dummytarg~5     .0284294    .060967     0.47   0.641    -.0915292    .1483879
1.dummytarg~4    -.0119914   .0596964    -0.20   0.841    -.1294499    .1054671
1.dummytarg~3     -.007567   .0604968    -0.13   0.901    -.1266002    .1114663
1.relatedne~y     .0035815   .0099718     0.36   0.720     -.016039     .023202
1.Overconfi~t      .015431   .0130593     1.18   0.238    -.0102645    .0411265
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55             323     11    .0825012    0.0470   1.539351   0.1243
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
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Table 11: Comparison of regression coefficients for overconfidence to explain market reaction 
between 2 groups (related deals and diversifying deals) from 2008 to 2009 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0.  
Panel A: Group 1 – Diversifying deals 
 
  
        _cons     -.173769   .0906505    -1.92   0.062    -.3569806    .0094426
1.dummymeth~8    -.0268111   .0388044    -0.69   0.494    -.1052378    .0516156
1.dummymeth~1    -.0082258   .0315847    -0.26   0.796    -.0720609    .0556093
       tobinq    -.0426575   .0283467    -1.50   0.140    -.0999484    .0146333
     leverage     .0092122   .1506288     0.06   0.952      -.29522    .3136444
logacquirer~e     .0113369   .0089027     1.27   0.210    -.0066561    .0293299
1.dummytarg~5            0  (omitted)
1.dummytarg~4     .0509872   .0393478     1.30   0.202    -.0285376     .130512
1.dummytarg~3     .0843487   .0481449     1.75   0.087    -.0129558    .1816532
1.Overconfi~t     .1165707   .0283044     4.12   0.000     .0593654    .1737761
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55              49      9    .0812171    0.3378   2.551045   0.0239
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
note: 1.dummytargetpublicstatus5 omitted because of collinearity
-> relatednessdummy = 0
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Table 11: Comparison of regression coefficients for overconfidence to explain market reaction 
between 2 groups (related deals and diversifying deals) from 2008 to 2009 (continued) 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Private target 
(dummytarg~3) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, other-
wise 0. Public target (dummytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is 
publicly owned, otherwise 0. Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the target is a subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic 
transformation of market value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total 
assets. Tobin’s Q is market value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is 
a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, other-
wise 0. Partially stock (dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder 
pays for the transaction involved stock, otherwise 0. 
Panel B: Group 2 – Related deals 
 
  
        _cons    -.5674023   .1494293    -3.80   0.001    -.8781576   -.2566469
1.dummymeth~8     .0717483   .0658469     1.09   0.288    -.0651879    .2086845
1.dummymeth~1     .0818091   .0650437     1.26   0.222    -.0534567    .2170749
       tobinq    -.0422012   .0277828    -1.52   0.144    -.0999787    .0155763
     leverage    -.4878959   .1698946    -2.87   0.009    -.8412112   -.1345807
logacquirer~e     .0160918   .0122254     1.32   0.202    -.0093323    .0415159
1.dummytarg~5            0  (omitted)
1.dummytarg~4     .4072893   .0850206     4.79   0.000     .2304793    .5840993
1.dummytarg~3     .3940427   .0927711     4.25   0.000     .2011146    .5869708
1.Overconfi~t     .0046537   .0437186     0.11   0.916    -.0862642    .0955716
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55              30      9    .0762771    0.7705   8.811792   0.0000
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
note: 1.dummytargetpublicstatus5 omitted because of collinearity
-> relatednessdummy = 1
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Table 11: Comparison of regression coefficients for overconfidence to explain market reaction 
between 2 groups (related deals and diversifying deals) from 2008 to 2009 (continued) 
Overconfident (Overconfi~t) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a CEO is overconfident, 
otherwise 0. Relatedness (relatedne~y) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the acquirer 
acquires a target which shares the first 2 digit of Fama French industry, otherwise 0. Overconfident 
* Relatedness (Overconfi~d) is a dummy interaction variable which takes a value of 1 if an overcon-
fident CEO is making a related acquisition, otherwise 0. Private target (dummytarg~3) is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is privately owned, otherwise 0. Public target (dum-
mytarg~4) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is publicly owned, otherwise 0. 
Subsidiary target (dummytarg~5) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the target is a 
subsidiary, otherwise 0. Log acquirer size (logacquirer~e) is logarithmic transformation of market 
value of assets. Leverage is book value of debts over market value of total assets. Tobin’s Q is market 
value of assets over book value of assets. Cash only (dummymeth~1) is a dummy variable which 
takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction in cash only, otherwise 0. Partially stock 
(dummymeth~8) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the bidder pays for the transaction 
involved stock, otherwise 0. 
Panel C: Interaction variable  
 
 
                                                                               
        _cons    -.2940445   .0869543    -3.38   0.001    -.4675591   -.1205299
1.overconfi~d    -.1431984   .0575436    -2.49   0.015    -.2580248   -.0283719
1.dummymeth~8     .0265946      .0358     0.74   0.460    -.0448432    .0980325
1.dummymeth~1     .0377666   .0300285     1.26   0.213    -.0221543    .0976875
       tobinq    -.0464678   .0221999    -2.09   0.040    -.0907669   -.0021687
     leverage    -.2476933   .1268027    -1.95   0.055    -.5007242    .0053376
logacquirer~e     .0216871   .0076519     2.83   0.006      .006418    .0369562
1.dummytarg~5            0  (omitted)
1.dummytarg~4     .0965929   .0404035     2.39   0.020      .015969    .1772168
1.dummytarg~3     .1207971   .0475207     2.54   0.013      .025971    .2156232
1.relatedne~y     .0095391   .0484949     0.20   0.845     -.087231    .1063091
1.Overconfi~t     .1122013   .0316962     3.54   0.001     .0489525    .1754502
                                                                               
        CAR55        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                               
CAR55              79     11    .0929821    0.4227   4.978509   0.0000
                                                                      
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"          F        P
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Appendix 1: Formula to calculate the control variables 
 
1. Tobin q = Market value of assets over book value of assets  
= (Total assets – Common equity + Number of common shares outstanding * Price (fiscal year) 
(monthly average)) / Total assets  
= (Item 6 – item 60 + item 25 * item 199) / item 6 
2. Leverage = Book value of debts over market value of total assets 
= (Debt in current liabilities + Long term debt) / (Total assets – Common equity + Number of common 
shares outstanding * Price (fiscal-year-end stock price)) 
= (Item 34 + item 9) / (Item 6 – item 60 + item 25 * item 199) 
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Appendix 2: Formula to calculate the marginal effect at the mean value of the explanatory var-
iables of log likelihood model (Dougherty, 2002) 
 
𝑓(𝑍)𝛽𝑖 =
𝑒−𝑍
(1 + 𝑒−𝑍)𝟐
𝛽𝑖 
 
where 𝛽𝑖 is the coefficient for variable i 
Z is the Z value of coefficient 𝛽𝑖 
 
 
 
 
 
